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Abstract 
This paper begins with the observation that the top-down model of defence 
cooperation adopted for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the 
European Union seems to be in a crisis. It then asks if there are alternative models 
available, arguing that one is represented by smaller, bottom-up initiatives such as the 
European Air Transport Command (EATC). By looking at the EATC, this paper shows 
that this type of initiatives provide a positive impact on the CSDP because they 
improve the overall level of European defence capabilities and because they show 
that it is possible for European countries to develop defence cooperation initiatives 
that are both efficient and effective. The EATC’s small-scale sectoral cooperation 
presents several advantages, the main ones being an easier decision-making process 
and a higher possible level of ambition, but on the other hand such a model restricts 
both the number of countries and the size of the impact that it can have. By identifying 
the key characteristics of the EATC model, this paper tries to determine the areas 
where the EATC could expand, and those where its business model could be 
successfully replicated. It argues that the best candidates are domains that combine 
constancy of use and low political sensibility, such as training or surveillance. 
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Introduction: European military cooperation at a standstill?1 
 
The external action of the European Union (EU) is governed by the articles of Title V of 
the Treaty on European Union, as codified by the Treaty of Lisbon.2 The whole last 
section of that Title is dedicated to the provisions regarding the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP).3 The CSDP is defined “an integral part” of the EU’s foreign 
policy, that “shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian 
and military assets”.4 It shall also “include the progressive framing of a common Union 
defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, 
acting unanimously, so decides”.5 
Despite the Treaty of Lisbon becoming effective on 1 December 2009, few of 
these goals have been reached in the last seven years. To the contrary, it seems clear 
to most observers that European military cooperation is currently facing a crisis. There 
are many reasons for this situation, but they all ultimately fall into one of two categories: 
a lack of willingness to develop the necessary mechanisms to assure such a 
cooperation and a lack of willingness to use even those mechanisms that are already 
available. Faced with such a blockage, one must consider whether there are 
alternative ways to promote defence cooperation among European countries, 
different from the top-down approach followed until now for the CSDP.6  
                                                 
1 I would not have been able to produce this work without the support that I have received 
from all the people whom I have contacted and interviewed in the course of my research. I 
wish in particular to thank the personnel of the EATC, from the Commander and Chief of Staff 
to the different Senior National Representatives (SNRs), who were extremely open and helpful 
during my two visits at Eindhoven. A special thanks also goes to the personnel of the Italian Air 
Force, both at the EATC and in Rome, without whose support the research for this work would 
have been much more difficult to conduct. I also wish to thank the personnel belonging to 
those countries and organisations not directly connected to the EATC, such as the EU Military 
Staff and NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability, who still took the time to answer my questions. 
2 European Union, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, C202, 7 June 
2016, Title V. 
3 Ibid., Title V, Chapter 2, section 2. 
4 Ibid., art. 42(1). 
5 Ibid., art. 42(2). 
6  This is not a new argument and the debate on the subject is vast. Antonio Missiroli, for 
example, proposes a series of reforms − such as the creation, within the European Commission, 
of a Directorate-General for Defence headed by its own Commissioner − that aim to make 
better use of the current EU institutional framework without having to change its underlying 
treaties. Missiroli, Antonio, “Guest Editorial: In Europe’s Defence”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, vol. 18, no. 3, 2013, p. 307. Tomas Valasek, on the other hand, presents a model that 
he calls “islands of cooperation”, based on reinforcing and encouraging the development of 
those small clusters of regional military cooperation that already exist on the European 
continent. Valasek, Tomas, Surviving Austerity: The Case for a New Approach to EU Military 
Collaboration, London, Centre for European Reform, 2011, p. 1. 
Matteo Ricci 
5 
This paper aims to do so by looking at a specific case, that of the European Air 
Transport Command (EATC), which is often used as a positive example of what can 
be accomplished.7 The questions I aim to answer are: to what extent does the EATC 
contribute to improving European defence cooperation? What are the advantages 
and limitations of this approach? And to what extent can the EATC serve as a tool to 
promote cooperation in other areas of the European defence sector? 
In the first part, I will describe what the EATC is and what it does. In the second 
part, I will look at the specificity of the EATC model, trying to identify the elements that 
define it and make it different from other, similar initiatives. In the third part, I will then 
look at the question of going beyond the current status of the EATC. I will show that 
the EATC is indeed a successful and efficient initiative that does contribute to improve 
European military capabilities, but also that this model has inherent limits in its 
reproducibility. Furthermore, I will argue that there is a clear problem of scaling: while 
its governance system worked well with just four Participating Nations (PNs) and it has 
managed to adapt effectively to the enlargement to seven PNs, it would encounter 
many difficulties if that number were to increase significantly.8 
What is the EATC? 
This section first introduces the creation of the EATC and then explains its structure.  
The establishment of the EATC 
The origins of the EATC can be traced back to a proposal made by France and 
Germany in 1999.9 The aim was to improve Europe’s strategic transport capabilities, 
which had been identified by a Western European Union (WEU) report as one of the 
main weaknesses of European militaries.10  
                                                 
7 Italian Ministry of Defence, European Air Transport Command, Rome, 2016 (unpublished), p. 
1. 
8 Given the scarcity of sources, the core of this work builds on a series of interviews that I 
conducted with representatives of the EATC, the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU 
Military Staff (EUMS) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as well as with officials 
of the militaries and Ministries of Defence (MoDs) of several European countries, both 
participants and non-participants in the EATC. In addition, I acquired information from a series 
of briefings that I either attended or of which I was able to obtain the minutes. 
9  EATC Policy & Support Division, “A Successful Example of Pooling & Sharing”, briefing, 
Eindhoven, European Air Transport Command, 16 March 2016. 
10 WEU Council of Ministers, “Council of Ministers, Audit of assets and capabilities for European 
crisis management operations”, Luxembourg, 22-23 November 1999.  
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In 2006, the two countries, soon joined by Belgium and the Netherlands, signed 
a Letter of Intent to officially launch the EATC project.11 This led to the drafting of a 
preliminary Concept, which was signed by the four Chiefs of Defence (CHoDs) on 11 
May 2007. 12  The signing was followed by more than two years of detailed 
negotiations.13 A key point of contention during this period was the question of where 
to base the new Command, as both Belgium and the Netherlands lobbied hard to 
have it on their territory.14 In the end, it was decided to establish the EATC in the Dutch 
base of Eindhoven.15 This had the added benefit of placing the EATC next to the seat 
of the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), turning Eindhoven into a hub 
for European military transport.16 With the finalisation of the last details, the Technical 
Arrangement (TA) officially setting up the EATC was signed by the four Defence 
Ministers on 30 June 2010, and the EATC was formally inaugurated two months later, 
on 1 September 2010.17 In 2012, the EATC saw its first expansion with the accession of 
Luxembourg, and Spain and Italy both formalised their accession in 2014.18 While the 
actual transfer of authority took some more time, the EATC has since 2016 control over 
the transport fleets of seven different PNs.19 
The legal basis for the EATC is the 2010 Technical Arrangement in its 2014 
consolidated version.20 The TA specifies that the purpose of the EATC is  
                                                 
11 Brigadier General Alain Rouceau, Chief of Staff and Deputy commander of EATC, “A New 
Air Command”, briefing, Brussels, European Parliament, 3 December 2010. 
12 European Air Transport Command, EATC Concept, Brussels, 11 May 2007, p. 9. 
13 EDA official 2, interview, Brussels, 1 March 2016. 
14 Ibid. See also Lieutenant Colonel Gerd Finck, EATC Head of Employment Branch & acting 
Belgian Senior National Representative, interview, Eindhoven, 16 March 2016; and Colonel 
Jurgen van der Biezen, EATC Head of Functional Division & Dutch Senior National 
Representative, interview, Eindhoven, 16 March 2016. 
15 Van der Biezen, op. cit. 
16 Ibid. The MCCE acts as a brokering house for the exchange of military transport services on 
air, land, and sea among its 27 member nations. Gianvanni, Paolo, “MCCE: l’agenzia per il 
trasporto militare” [“MCCE: The Military Transport Agency”], RID: Rivista Italiana Difesa, year 
2008, no. 5, May 2008, pp. 61-65. 
17 European Air Transport Command, Technical Arrangement between the Minister of Defence 
of The Kingdom of Belgium, the Minister of Defence of the French Republic, the Federal Ministry 
of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Minister of Defence of The Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, concerning The European Air Transport Command, including the Note of 
Participation of the Ministry of Defence of the Italian Republic to the Technical Arrangement 
concerning the European Air Transport Command dated 30 June 2010, amended on 22 
November 2012 and on 3 July 2014, Eindhoven, 4 December 2014, p. 17 [Hereafter, “EATC TA”]. 
The inauguration date is from EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
18 European Air Transport Command, EATC TA, op. cit., p. 17. 
19 Colonel Daniele Gaboli, EATC Deputy Head of Policy & Support Division & Italian Senior 
National Representative, interview, Eindhoven, 16 March 2016. 
20 European Air Transport Command, EATC TA, op. cit. 
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to integrate within EATC as a single multinational command all relevant 
national responsibilities and personnel [...] thus improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Participants’ military efforts.21 
 
The EATC focuses on striving to harmonise and optimise the preparation 
and the use, including planning, of airlift capacities.22 
 
Negotiations are ongoing to replace the TA with a more detailed international treaty, 
which will, among other things, give the EATC the status of an international 
organisation with its own legal personality.23 The hope is to be able to sign it before the 
end of 2017.24 
The EATC TA has established a governance system that sees at its top the 
Multinational Air Transport Committee (MATraC)25. The MATraC meets at least once 
per year at the level of Chiefs of Air Staff or their representatives, and requires the 
unanimity of its members to pass decisions.26 Its role is that of a steering board, carrying 
out tasks like discussing any changes to the EATC’s structure and approving the 
common budget. 27  The MATraC also appoints and issues directives to the 
Commander of the EATC (COM), a two-star general who is the ultimate responsible 
for the execution of the EATC missions.28 The Commander is assisted by a Chief of Staff 
(COS, a one-star general) who also acts as the EATC’s Deputy Commander.29 Until 
now, the two positions of COM and COS have always been occupied by French and 
German generals. 30 
Another integral element of the EATC are the seven Senior National 
Representatives (SNRs).31 The SNRs, one from each Participating Nation, have several 
roles connected with managing their country’s participation in the EATC, among 
                                                 
21 Ibid., section 3. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Colonel Frank Best, EATC Deputy Head of Operational Division & German Senior National 
Representative, interview, Eindhoven, 16 March 2016. A side effect of the signing of the treaty 
is that the EATC personnel will lose all the benefits related to the current Status of Forces 
Agreement, tax breaks included. Van der Biezen, op. cit. 
24 Ibid. 
25 European Air Transport Command, EATC TA, op. cit., section 6. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., sections 6 and 7. 
29  Brigadier General Pascal Chiffoleau, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of EATC, 
interview, Eindhoven, 12 April 2016.  
30 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
31 European Air Transport Command, EATC TA, op. cit., section 9. 
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which is the enforcement of disciplinary actions among their national personnel.32 In 
addition to these national tasks, each SNR has also to fulfil a role within the EATC 
hierarchy.33 Except for the case of Luxembourg, which has sent a civilian SNR who is 
the Command’s Chief Public Affairs Officer, all other SNRs are lieutenant colonels or 
full colonels and they serve as the Head or Deputy Head of the three Divisions that 
compose the Command: Operational, Functional and Policy & Support.34  
The Operational Division 
Starting with the planning of the missions up to the post-flight review, the Operational 
Division manages the aircraft under the control of the EATC.35 This control is given via 
a Transfer of Authority (ToA) document that each Participating Nation has to write and 
keep up to date.36 The ToA specifies the list of all the assets and associated personnel 
whose control has been handed over to the EATC, as well as any national caveats 
restricting their use.37 The two key elements of the ToA are that it refers to each specific 
plane, identified by its tail number, and that it is a living document, which can be 
updated without any advance notice.38 This means that a Participating Nation can, 
at any time, decide to add (ToA) or remove (Revoke of ToA, RToA) from the EATC pool 
any number of its platforms, from a single aircraft up to, potentially, its entire fleet.39  
Another task of the Operational Division is to update each PN’s Air Transport & 
Air-to-Air Refuelling and other Exchange of Services (ATARES) balance.40 ATARES is a 
standardised system for managing the exchange of flight services among different air 
forces.41 Its base unit is the Equivalent Flying Hour (EFH), which is the cost needed to fly 
a C-130 or C-160 aircraft for one hour.42 Every time a country uses an aircraft belonging 
to another ATARES member to transport its own cargo, it contracts an ATARES debt 
corresponding to the EFH used for that flight.43 Two provisions ensure a smooth running 
                                                 
32 Ibid. Since the power of discipline, a key element of command authority, has not been 
transferred to the EATC, each country needs to have a figure who has the authority to enforce 
discipline among its personnel stationed at the Command.  
33 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 European Air Transport Command, EATC Terms of Reference, Eindhoven, 10 September 2015, 
p. 6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Gianvanni, op. cit., p. 63. 
43 Ibid. 
Matteo Ricci 
9 
of the system. Because no country can accumulate a deficit of more than 300 EFH, in 
the long run each participant is forced to put in as many hours as it takes. 44 
Furthermore, the account is kept with the community as a whole.45 This means that a 
debt can be repaid by providing an equivalent service to any ATARES user, not just to 
the one with which it was incurred, turning bilateral exchanges into a true multilateral 
system. The effect of this element can be compared to the introduction of currency 
into a trading system that, until then, had been based on barter. 
The Functional Division 
The Functional Division is one of the main innovations of the EATC. It is tasked with 
promoting harmonisation and developing common policies among the different EATC 
Participating Nations.46 These are very challenging goals, as they encroach on the 
domains of national bureaucracies and on the interests of local industries.47 In order to 
offer a flexible solution to this challenge, the EATC Concept foresees three different 
levels of authority (Recommending, Coordinating, and Command) that the PNs can 
give the Command.48 These are applied separately for each PN and for each domain, 
and are spelled out in each country’s ToA document. 49  
This patchwork of differing authorities, while complex, has allowed the 
Functional Division to bring the PNs of the EATC together on several technical issues.50 
Such work has made the EATC the natural candidate to become Europe’s centre of 
expertise for the airlift domain.51 Especially if one considers that the EATC includes most 
of the users of the A400M transport and that it currently controls more than 60% of all 
European military air transport capacity.52 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
47 Dutch military officer, interview, The Hague, 4 March 2016. This was a point raised by many of 
the people that I interviewed. 
48 European Air Transport Command, EATC Concept, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
49 Ibid. 
50 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. All EATC PNs except Italy and the Netherlands have placed orders for the A400M, which 
has also been ordered by Malaysia, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Airbus Defence & Space, 
“Orders, Deliveries, In Operation Military aircraft by Country – Worldwide”, February 2016. 
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The Policy & Support Division 
Operative since the beginning of 2016, the Policy & Support Division constitutes the first 
main change in the EATC’s structure since its founding.53 It has collected under its aegis 
a series of departments that deal with the functioning of the EATC itself, such as the 
Legal Department and the Finance Section, which previously reported directly to the 
COS.54 
There were two main reasons for creating this new Division. First, once the new 
treaty is signed and the EATC becomes an international organisation, the Command 
will have to take on many administrative responsibilities that are currently being 
shouldered by the Netherlands in its role as Host Nation.55 The role of the support staff 
will then have to grow accordingly.56 The main reason, in my opinion, is, however, 
related to the EATC’s enlargement to Italy and Spain. The original agreement among 
the four founding countries of the EATC was that the roles of COM and COS would 
rotate between France and Germany, while Belgium and the Netherlands would have 
the heads of the two original Divisions. 57  While the addition of Luxembourg was 
relatively easy to absorb, the enlargement to Spain and Italy upset this institutional 
balance.58 Furthermore, the two new military SNRs needed to be assigned positions 
commensurate to their rank.59 The result was the creation of a third Division, which 
permitted the development of a new balance. All six military SNRs are now on a more 
or less equal footing, and the positions of Commander and Deputy Commander are 
potentially open to any PN.60 A side effect of this new balance, however, has been to 
make the appointments for those two top positions more politically complex than 
before.61 Tellingly, the two MATraCs that have been convened during 2016 have both 
failed to find a common position on this subject.62 
                                                 
53 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Van der Biezen, op. cit. 
56 Finck, op. cit. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Gaboli, op. cit. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Massucci, op. cit. 
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An Analysis of the EATC 
This section identifies the specific elements that define the EATC model. 
A European initiative 
No military cooperation initiative can survive for long without some measure of political 
backing.63 In the case of the EATC, an element to consider is its European matrix. 
Officially, the EATC is an independent organisation with its own rules and statute. Yet 
the fact that all its PNs are at the same time also members of both the EU and NATO 
cannot be ignored. 
The perception of a link between the EATC and the EU was a clear pull factor 
in the decision by Italy and Spain to join the Command. The higher echelons of the 
two countries’ militaries were tepid if not sceptical about a possible participation, and 
it was their political masters who ultimately promoted the decision.64 In Spain, which 
had the additional pull factor of being an A400M operator, the leaders of the Ejército 
del Aire were willing to cooperate, but they were against any kind of integrated 
command. 65  The politicians, instead, were very much in favour of an initiative 
connected with furthering European defence capabilities. 66  The latter ultimately 
carried the day, but the intensity of the dispute can be inferred by the fact that it took 
seven years, from 2007 to 2014, before Spain decided to join the EATC as a full 
member.67 
The case of Italy is perhaps even more evident. Initially, Italy had chosen to 
remain out of the EATC.68 In mid-2013, however, after several preliminary studies, a 
letter was sent to the MATraC to begin negotiations for Italy’s accession.69 At this 
juncture, the European political angle played an important role. Italy was scheduled 
to hold the rotating presidency of the EU Council during the second semester of 2014, 
and there was therefore political pressure to conclude the negotiations quickly, in 
                                                 
63 Valentin, op. cit. 
64 For Italy, Major General Gianni Candotti, Head of the Aerospace Planning Division, Italian Air 
Force, interview, Rome, 24 March 2016; for Spain, Colonel Rafael Sánchez Gómez, EATC 
Deputy Head of Tasking Branch & Spanish Senior National Representative, interview, 
Eindhoven, 16 March 2016. 
65 Sánchez Gómez, op. cit. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Candotti, op. cit. 
69 Italian Ministry of Defence, op. cit., p. 1. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2016 
12 
order for the signing ceremony to take place during that period. 70  The political 
deadline was ultimately, if just barely, respected, as the signing ceremony took place 
in Rome on 4 December 2014.71 In her speech, Italian Defence Minister Roberta Pinotti 
made an explicit reference to the perceived link between the EATC and the EU, by 
describing the event as one of the successes of the Italian semester. 72  The 
concomitant press release added that with this action Italy showed its commitment to 
apply the decisions taken by the European Council of December 2013.73  
The same analysis, but leading to different conclusions, can be made 
concerning the position of the United Kingdom (UK) vis-à-vis the EATC. As the owner of 
one of the largest military transport fleets in Europe, which includes notably eight C-17 
heavy lifters, and as the only non-PN European user of the A400M besides Turkey, the 
UK would find many reasons to benefit from a participation in the EATC.74 In July 2013, 
about the same time as Italy was finalising its own decision to join the EATC, a British 
fact-finding mission led by the Deputy CHoD visited the Command.75 The different 
choices made by these two countries can probably be attributed, at least in part, to 
their different vision concerning the role of the EU. 76  Many of my interviewees 
mentioned that they believed the Royal Air Force was quite interested in the EATC, but 
that the British politicians find it very difficult to consider participating in something that 
contains the words ‘European’ and ‘Command’ together in its name. This tendency 
will probably be reinforced by the UK’s decision to leave the EU, as the UK is expected 
now to focus more on NATO and on bilateral ties with select European countries rather 
than on multilateral cooperation.77 
A pooling and sharing initiative 
As I have shown, the EATC is built on two pillars: the operational pillar of managing the 
national fleets together as a single entity, and the functional pillar of promoting 
                                                 
70 It is a fact that the negotiations for Italy’s joining took much less time than those needed for 
Spain, even though the latter had the advantage of having been an observer since 2007. See 
Gaboli, op. cit. 
71 “Trasporto aereo europeo: l’Italia aderisce all’accordo. Pinotti: massimizzare sinergie per 
risparmiare”, Ministero della Difesa, 4 December 2014. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Valentin, op. cit. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid.  
77  De Briganti, Giovanni, “Brexit Could Reinforce UK-French Defense Ties”, Defense-
Aerospace.com; 27 June 2016. 
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harmonisation and developing a common expertise.78 It is at the operational level that 
the benefits brought by a country’s participation in the EATC are at the same time 
more apparent and less controversial.79 
The first benefit derives from the sheer size and variety of the EATC fleet, which, 
as of January 2016, has operational control (OPCON) over 175 aircraft of 17 different 
types.80 This spectrum, which is much broader than what any single European air force 
can field, greatly increases the chance to find the right match between the Air 
Transport Requests that are received and the platforms that are available.81 When 
combined with the possibility of loading the same aircraft with cargo from multiple 
PNs, the result is a general decrease in the number of flights conducted with aircraft 
that are either empty or only partially laden.82 This more efficient use of the fleet 
reduces in turn the overall number of flights that are required to provide the same 
service, decreasing the wear and tear of the aircraft and, most importantly, increasing 
the time available to the parent units to conduct maintenance and training 
exercises.83 It also reduces the need to resort to outsourcing contracts, with benefits in 
terms of economic savings and quality of service.84 To give a measure of the impact 
of these changes, the Belgian SNR claimed that the annual funding that his country 
had saved thanks to the EATC was already higher than the EATC’s entire budget.85 
The benefit of access to a larger and more varied fleet is, in theory, already 
available to all participants in the ATARES exchange system managed by the MCCE. 
The added value of the EATC, however, is that it has the authority to manage its fleet 
as a single entity. This makes it much easier to use its services than the MCCE, which 
functions as a broker where the individual countries have to invest time in finding a 
correspondence to each specific need. 86 The Italian SNR remarked that, just two 
months after his country’s aircraft had been put under EATC OPCON, the number of 
flights they had conducted using ATARES exchanges had already been much higher 
than expected.87 The Dutch SNR also remarked that, since the founding of the EATC, 
                                                 
78 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
79 Badia, op. cit. 
80 EATC Policy & Support Division, op. cit. 
81 Italian Ministry of Defence, op. cit., p. 1. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Finck, op. cit. 
84 Italian Ministry of Defence, op. cit., p. 1. 
85 Finck, op. cit. 
86 Van der Biezen, op. cit. 
87 Gaboli, op. cit. 
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the PNs had started to help each other out. 88 If, for example, one of them was forced 
to incur a temporary ATARES deficit due to technical problems, once such problems 
were resolved, the others would prioritise the use of that country’s aircraft in order to 
bring its ATARES account back into balance.89 This is an indicator of the socialisation 
potential of the EATC, that is, its capacity to influence and modify in a permanent 
manner the behaviour of its PNs. 
A permanent command 
What defines the EATC is not just the fact that it is an integrated command. It also has 
a permanent peacetime establishment that operates every single day of the year.90 
Furthermore, barring RToAs, the units it controls are assigned to it on a permanent 
basis.91 These are key elements, as they mean that the expertise that is developed 
remains in the common institutional memory, influencing every successive dealing, 
and that the dealings are continuous and not occasional. 
The permanence of the EATC also allows for a further development. One of the 
problems identified with pooling and sharing initiatives like the EATC is that they do not 
always produce economic savings, as they are often added on top of already existing 
structures, creating duplications and increasing the complexity of the whole system.92 
In the case of the EATC, however, another choice is available. The Technical 
Arrangement allows for the setting up, when needed, of a national planning cell 
headed by that country’s SNR and composed of personnel already assigned to the 
headquarters (HQ).93 Because this national cell possesses all the resources required to 
plan national missions with national assets, there is no longer a need to maintain a 
duplicate structure in the national capital. 94  In fact, in 2011, as part of a wider 
reorganisation of the whole structure of its armed forces, Germany made the choice 
to close down its Air Force Transport Command and to transfer its entire tasks to the 
EATC and its national personnel working there. 95 The result has been that, with a 
contribution to the HQ in Eindhoven that currently numbers 53 people, Germany has 
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been able to replace a national command staff that employed more than 200 
persons, while at the same time having access to the wider fleet of the EATC.96  
The key vulnerability of the EATC is the same as every other initiative that 
involves more than one country: what happens if the PNs are in disagreement?97 The 
structure of the EATC is such that the units it controls belong each to a single country.98 
In other words, at the operational level, because there are no mixed units, the impact 
of possible disagreements is limited to the platforms belonging to the specific nations 
involved: should Belgium not wish to participate in an operation, that would not block 
the deployment of Dutch planes, and vice versa.99 It is at the multinational HQ level 
that problems would arise, as the limited amount of staff means that if even a single 
country prevents its personnel from working, it could, potentially, block the operations 
of the whole EATC. 100  The compromise mechanism that has been developed to 
prevent such an occurrence is contained in section 3 of the EATC Technical 
Arrangement.101 While the PNs recognise that the EATC might participate in operations 
in which not all of them wish to take part, they can always prevent their personnel from 
being engaged “in any activity in the context of this operation”.102 The wording of this 
text is very important: it specifies that while a country that does not wish to participate 
in an operation can ban its personnel from having any role in it, it can neither block 
the action of the EATC as a whole, nor prevent its EATC personnel from being given 
tasks not related to that operation.103 This leads back to the importance of the EATC 
being a permanent command in continuous use. The variety and amount of missions 
to be planned on a daily basis is usually enough to absorb the work of personnel 
subject to national caveats.104 
The flexibility of this arrangement was put to the test less than a year after the 
EATC became operational, during the allied intervention in Libya.105 In that specific 
case, the intervention was spearheaded by one of the EATC PNs, France, while 
another, Germany, had abstained in the United Nations Security Council vote and did 
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not wish to participate in the operations.106 The solution found was that, while French 
cargo planes under EATC OPCON provided logistic support for the bombing 
campaign, German planes under EATC OPCON took over most of the intra-European 
transport tasks that constitute the bulk of EATC missions.107 Such a compromise allowed 
every PN to remain within its national caveats, without disrupting the operations of the 
EATC or requiring specific RToAs.108 
The functional pillar 
The previous sections have shown how the EATC fits the classic model of pooling and 
sharing, as it is based on the dual elements of a centralised control of a pool of 
nationally-owned platforms, and of the possibility of the use of a single aircraft to be 
shared among several participants. What makes the EATC go beyond the basic 
pooling and sharing model is, however, the presence within its structure of a second 
pillar, the one represented by the Functional Division.109  
Located at the junction of the interests of politics, industry, and militaries, the 
Functional Division is the component of the EATC that is best placed to promote 
structural change in the way in which the Participating Nations deal with each 
other.110 For such change to take place, however, two conditions need to be met.111 
The first is that the countries involved perceive the need for change, that is, that they 
are convinced that altering the status quo is going to benefit them in some way.112 
The second is that they are willing to spend political capital to go against interests that 
are often entrenched at the highest levels of the armed forces themselves.113 
This is where the permanence of the EATC offers another advantage: as its 
multinational fleet is in constant use, the benefits offered by reforms, such as 
introducing a common, fleet-wide, diplomatic clearance system, become readily 
apparent and measurable.114 Furthermore, many of the aircraft types under EATC 
OPCON are in service with more than one PN, a situation that can encourage the 
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launch of joint initiatives to support them.115 France and Germany, for example, have 
agreed to share the use of the A400M Pilot Training Centre of Orleans, with Belgium 
and Luxembourg also considering their participation.116  
The fact that the EATC controls more than 60% of the whole European transport 
capacity, also makes it very likely that any standard agreed among its PNs would 
become the de facto European standard. 117  Bulgaria has for example already 
adopted in its national system some regulations that were developed by the EATC.118 
The official EATC policy concerning the work of the Functional Division, which is not 
classified and can be consulted and adopted freely by any actor, further helps to 
diffuse norms beyond the circle of the Participating Nations.119 
What really tips the balance in favour of the EATC, however, is the sheer size of 
the Functional Division.120 No single European country or organisation has 60 people 
tasked with finding the best and most efficient way to use their airlift fleet.121 As a 
comparison, the European Union Military Staff has a total of two officers dealing with 
the same subject.122 This makes the EATC the main repository of expertise on the 
subject of air transport and air-to-air refuelling in Europe, and the natural place where 
to develop the future doctrines and regulations concerning those domains.123 Such a 
status has recently been recognised by the EU Military Staff, which signed at the end 
of April 2016 a Memorandum of Understanding with the Commander of the EATC to 
gain access to the expertise of the Functional Division.124  
The way forward 
Having described the past and present of the EATC, this section looks at its possible 
future developments.  
Enlargement 
The first question is whether it is likely, or useful, for the EATC to take on further members. 
I argue that such an enlargement is unlikely, at least in the short term, for three main 
                                                 
115 Ibid. 
116 “A400M Training Centre Now Operational”, European Air Transport Command, 28 April 2014. 
117 Badia, op. cit. 
118 Kolm, op. cit. 
119 Best, op. cit. 
120 Badia, op. cit. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2016 
18 
reasons. The first reason is that the EATC is currently suffering from what can be called 
‘enlargement fatigue’. In little more than a year, it has expanded first to Spain and 
then to Italy. These two countries now provide about one third of the EATC’s budget 
and staff.125 It takes time for a relatively small organisation like the EATC to absorb such 
a large influx.126 It takes even more time for the newcomers to adapt their procedures, 
and especially their mindsets, to the way things are done at the EATC.127 Especially if 
one considers that even the founding nations have yet to fully adapt to the existence 
of a permanent multinational command that their national chains of command have 
to relate to.128  
The second reason is related to governance. 129  The EATC functions also 
because, so far, the number of PNs has remained limited and it is therefore relatively 
easy to find an agreement among them.130 The complications posed by a consensus-
based steering mechanism are, however, always present, and the complexity has 
increased since the enlargement to seven PNs. 131  This enlargement has already 
resulted in the need to create a third Division and the negotiations in the MATraC to 
find an agreement on the allocation of rotational positions or for the eventual creation 
of a position for a third general have become much more difficult.132 Any additional 
enlargement would further increase this strain, which raises the question of whether 
the current governance system puts a de facto limit on the number of countries that 
can join the EATC before it becomes ungovernable.133 
A third reason, that should not be underestimated, are the differing views of the 
PNs in respect to the quantity and quality of places that they need to have for their 
nationals at the EATC.134 Every balanced air force needs to have in its upper echelons 
officers who come from different branches, including the transport sector, and who 
can therefore represent to the military and political leaders the expertise and interests 
of their sector.135 If, however, as in the case of Germany, a country takes the step to 
close down its national transport command and replaces it with a smaller staff 
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assigned at the EATC, such a country needs to make sure that its transport officers still 
have a margin to progress in their career.136 This is why Germany feels that it needs to 
have a general’s slot at the EATC always available to one of its nationals.137 However, 
were all seven PNs to make the same choice and express the same requirement, the 
system would break down, as there are only two positions available for generals. On 
the opposite side, for smaller countries like Belgium or the Netherlands, it is already very 
difficult to find staff with the right qualifications to cover the position of SNR, and they 
could not afford to spare a general for a rotation at the EATC.138  
The current problems would be further exacerbated by an expansion to 
another large country, as the new PN would also add its requirements in terms of 
command positions. 139  Furthermore, the new PN would want to bring in its own 
personnel to an extent equivalent to its financial participation.140 As the size of the 
EATC’s staff is determined by its operational needs and does not increase linearly with 
each enlargement, the effect of each expansion is a reduction in the amount of EATC 
personnel belonging to each single PN. 141  If one extrapolates this trend, further 
enlargements would keep reducing the size of each country’s national staff up to the 
point where it drops below the number required to form a fully-functioning national 
planning cell.142 Such a staff would also be too small to offer a viable career path to 
its personnel, or to ensure that the corresponding PN feels any ownership of the EATC 
programme.143 A solution to this dilemma would be the development of a common 
European armed force with its own career path, similar to the common career of 
European Union personnel. 144  Even though Commission President Juncker has 
repeatedly called for the establishment of an “European army”, it is unlikely that such 
a measure will be implemented, at least in the short-to-medium term.145 
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Alternatives to enlargement 
Given that a further enlargement seems unlikely to occur in the near future, the logical 
consequence is to consider alternatives to full membership, which would allow the 
EATC to develop a relationship with third countries. During my research, I came across 
proposals for at least four different ways to develop such an arrangement. 
The first option is a two-tiered system where a country could sign an agreement 
with one or more EATC PNs to share the use of its aircrafts and/or to place a portion of 
its aircraft under EATC OPCON without joining the Command.146 The third country’s 
requests would be transmitted via its sponsoring nation(s), who would take care of 
them within the EATC structure. As a non-member of the EATC, the third country would 
not have to pay its share of the common budget or send personnel to the integrated 
command.147 It would just need to assign a liaison, something that is already foreseen 
in the Technical Arrangement and which has the advantage of providing the EATC 
with additional manpower at no cost for the Command.148 Such an arrangement 
would be particularly appealing to smaller countries. 149  However, the country in 
question would not have a seat in the MATraC or staff in the Functional Division and it 
would therefore be unable to influence the future developments of the EATC.  
A reverse of this first arrangement could be envisaged for countries that do not 
wish to put their aircraft under EATC OPCON, but which are interested in the work of 
the Functional Division. Depending on the interest of the third country, it could just 
assign a liaison. If it wants something more, an arrangement could be found where, 
for example, the third country sends a small staff to augment the personnel of the 
Functional Division and takes over a corresponding share of the common expenses.150 
A more ambitious alternative is that of developing regional EATCs.151 Instead of 
concentrating everything in Eindhoven, a ‘franchising’ system could be developed, 
where a series of additional Commands based on the EATC model are set up in 
different areas of Europe.152 Each regional EATC would have OPCON of the fleets of 
its local participants and it would coordinate its planning with those of the other 
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regions, while the Functional Division would remain centralised in Eindhoven.153 Such a 
system would have three main advantages: while the total number of Participating 
Nations could be quite high, each regional EATC would still only have a small number 
of PNs, reducing to a minimum the governance problems described in the previous 
section. Furthermore, a regional perspective would facilitate the relationship of the 
EATC with other initiatives at the regional level. Finally, such an arrangement would 
further improve the efficient use of the transport fleets, as the aircraft under each 
Command’s OPCON would be based in a relatively small area, facilitating their shared 
use among different PNs.154 On the negative side, such a multi-tiered and distributed 
structure would be more complex than the current, centralised one and it would 
probably require a correspondingly higher amount of staff. The setting up of regional 
EATCs would also require the presence in the area of a minimum number of countries 
that are willing to participate, creating problems for those nations that are interested 
in such a scheme, but whose neighbours are not. 
At the other end of the ambition and complexity spectrum, the simplest 
arrangement would be that of selling flight hours on EATC aircraft to third countries.155 
This could appeal in particular to smaller countries with regional needs.156 It would also 
complement effectively the push for regional EATCs, because it could be offered as a 
temporary solution to third countries that are interested in the scheme, but which have 
not yet found enough partners to merit the creation of a regional branch. 
Functional expansion 
In addition to the inclusion of more countries, either as full members or with other kinds 
of arrangements, there is another type of ‘enlargement’ to be considered: that of the 
EATC expanding its activities into other domains. This concept is nothing new in itself. 
In fact, the EATC of 2016 has already a broader role than the one of 2010.157 Its original 
focus, as its name implies, was mainly on air transport, but the neighbouring fields of 
air-to-air refuelling and medical evacuation, which were of limited importance during 
the first years, have recently gained more importance.158  
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Looking at further such expansions, one should not forget the example of the 
MCCE, which shows that logistics is an inherently multimodal world.159 In this field, what 
the user needs is that a specific item is delivered to a specific place on a specific time 
at the lowest possible cost.160 The type of platform that is used to answer this need, 
whether it is a ship, a truck or an airplane, is not as important as getting the job done.161 
There are indeed no technical reasons why the EATC should focus itself only on air 
transport.162 In a similar way to how the predecessor of the EATC, the European Airlift 
Centre, led to the creation of the Sealift Coordination Centre, with the two then 
merging four years later to give birth to the MCCE, one could therefore envisage the 
setting up of a sealift and/or land transport cell within the EATC.163 Over time, the EATC 
could then be given the responsibility of managing the whole military transport chain 
of its PNs.164  
A different direction would be that of expanding the EATC into the sector of 
maintenance. Once the new treaty is signed, the EATC will acquire legal personality 
and it will be able to conduct its own procurement. At that point, the conditions would 
be set for it to be able to also engage in common procurement on behalf of the PNs. 
One could envisage for example the development of a common framework contract 
for procuring spare parts for aircraft, like the A400M or the C-130, that are in service 
among several PNs. There are, however, three factors working against the 
development of such a measure. The first is a history of reticence of the PNs in 
engaging in collective procurement.165 The second is the fact that, while different PNs 
have in service the same types of planes, in many cases those aircraft have been 
modified to respond to specific national requirements, reducing the potential pool of 
common spare parts.166 Finally, there are other organisations beside the EATC, like the 
European Defence Agency, that already have a history of managing common 
procurement and which are probably better equipped, in terms of staff and 
experience, to engage in this type of initiatives.167 
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The EATC as a model 
The final element to consider is whether, instead of directly expanding the role of the 
EATC, its business model could be applied successfully in other areas of the military 
domain. As shown previously, there are five elements that comprise the EATC model: 
(1) the presence of a permanent peacetime establishment with units that are used 
constantly and assigned to it on a long-term basis; (2) a governance structure where 
the Commander has operational control over said units, while the steering is assured 
by a consensus-based committee; (3) a pooling and sharing system whereby the 
different units are managed as a single fleet and the use of an individual platform can 
be shared among several PNs; (4) the fact that any one unit, or even just a single 
platform, can be returned at any time under national control should the need arise; 
and (5) the presence of a Functional Division that can promote harmonisation and 
function as a repository of expertise. Taking into account these elements, what are the 
domains where such a model would work effectively? 
A first remark to make is that the EATC deals with logistics. While logistics is a key 
domain that no modern military can afford to ignore, it is also something that rarely 
receives public attention.168 Most of the people that I interviewed agreed that one of 
the elements that favoured the establishment of the EATC was that sharing the use of 
airlifters is much less politically sensitive than sharing the use of something like an 
aircraft carrier. In military jargon, the EATC deals with tasks that are non-kinetic, that is, 
tasks which do not result in direct physical attacks.169 The closer one gets to the kinetic 
domain, the more relevant are the questions concerning national interests and 
responsibility. 170  The creation of a combat command would also run the risk of 
duplicating structures that already exist within NATO, something which would be 
neither cost-efficient, nor acceptable to many countries.171 If one goes a step further 
and considers the possibility of sharing combat platforms, each participating country 
would then need to be fully convinced that it could still make use of those shared 
capabilities to cover the needs of its own national defence.172 Such a scheme would 
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also raise important legal questions: if, for example, a Belgian pilot on a Dutch fighter 
shoots down an aircraft, which country bears the ultimate responsibility for their act?173  
As a result of all these legal and political challenges, one can safely assume 
that the further one is from kinetic actions, the easier it is to develop cooperation 
models. Which are then the domains where replicating the EATC model could bring a 
true added value? A first candidate is clearly the world of military logistics. If enlarging 
the EATC’s responsibilities to cover also sea and/or land transportation was, for any 
reason, to prove unfeasible, one could instead envisage the creation of sectorial 
duplicates, like a European Sea Transport Command and/or a European Land 
Transport Command.174  
Moving away from the logistics domain, other areas to consider are the ones 
originally identified in the so-called ‘Ghent Initiative’, a ‘food for thought’ paper 
released by the German and Swedish governments in November 2010 that started the 
debate in Europe concerning pooling and sharing.175 Such domains are, in addition to 
logistics and air transport,  
those support structures required for education, training and exercises 
[…] such as military academies, test and evaluation facilities and pilot 
training, as well as capabilities related to tasks such as aerial and 
maritime surveillance […], or other niche capabilities.176 
All those domains further share with the EATC two characteristics that are key for the 
functioning of its model: a constancy of use and the possibility of sharing their facilities 
and/or platforms among different countries. In the field of pilot training, furthermore, 
there is already a long history of bilateral cooperation, as exemplified by the fact that 
the training of Belgian pilots now takes place on French soil.177 That same domain, 
however, has also already seen the failure of the Advanced European Jet Pilot Training 
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System (AEJPT) project. 178 Launched in 1997 and effectively abandoned since 2012, 
the AEJPT aimed to create a European-wide school to train future fighter pilots.179 
The failure of the AEJPT project illustrates another key requirement for the 
success of such an initiative: the need to have the defence industry on board. It is 
evident that the creation of the EATC dovetailed with the industrial interests of Airbus, 
the producer of the A400M.180 Similarly, France and Germany lost most of their interest 
in the AEJPT project once Airbus (then known under the name of its parent company, 
European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., EADS)181 abandoned its plans to develop 
a new jet trainer, called the Mako.182  
Ultimately, however, the success of a cooperation initiative is determined by 
the will of its participating states. This in turn requires first and foremost that those states 
develop a high enough level of trust and confidence in their partners, which is why the 
initiatives that do last are the ones that have a built-in mechanism to foster such 
confidence.183 Even with the best business model available, however, if the countries 
to which it is proposed feel that it will compromise their national security, or encroach 
too much on their sovereignty, the project will never be adopted. A first step is to 
convince the higher echelons of the armed forces, as it is difficult – though not 
impossible, as shown by the case of Italy and Spain’s participation to the EATC – for a 
political leader to see the advantages of such an initiative when its military counsellors 
are against it.184 Having the backing of the CHoD, or some other high-placed figure, is 
also important when facing the internal resistance of the military bureaucracies: being 
the person in charge, the CHoD can ultimately simply order the recalcitrant parties to 
comply.185 
The backing of the militaries and the support of the industrial sector are, 
however, only pre-conditions for the success of an initiative of military cooperation. 
The ultimate deciding factor remains the political will to see this initiative through. If 
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there is enough will, then solutions are ultimately found. The existence of the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command, founded by Canada and the United States 
in 1958 to oversee something as inherently fraught with sovereignty issues as the 
common defence of their respective airspaces, has been proving this point for more 
than half a century.186  
Conclusions 
This paper has explored the following questions: to what extent does the EATC 
contribute to improving European defence cooperation? What are the advantages 
and limitations of its approach? To what extent can the EATC be used as a tool to 
promote cooperation in other areas of the European defence sector? 
Concerning the first question, my analysis finds that the EATC is a successful 
example of pooling and sharing that has contributed to improving the overall level of 
European military capabilities. Its success shows that it is indeed possible for European 
countries to develop military cooperation initiatives that are both effective and 
efficient. Combined with the socialisation effect of the multinational HQ and the work 
of the Functional Division, the overall impact is that of making the EATC PNs better 
disposed to cooperate with each other. Such an impact, however, should not be 
overestimated. The EATC remains, at least for the moment, a sectoral initiative that 
deals with a single domain, that of air transport and associated tasks. 
Moving to the second question, the main advantage of an EATC-style 
approach is that it only includes those countries which are really interested in its 
success. This makes it easier for them to cooperate and to attain higher levels of 
ambition. The EATC’s small size and sectoral approach also both favour the reaching 
of decisions, even when faced with a consensus-based decision mechanism. Those 
same elements, however, constitute the EATC’s main limiting factors. It is improbable 
that the EATC will be able to grow much beyond its current size. At least, not without 
implementing radical changes that are not even part of current debates, such as 
moving away from consensus or establishing a common European military force with 
its own career paths.  
The third question has been addressed in detail in the last part of this paper. I 
have shown that the EATC model is based on the following characteristics: (1) 
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presence of a permanent peacetime establishment that is in constant use; (2) a 
governance structure where the Commander has operational control over its units, 
while the steering is assured by a consensus-based committee; (3) a pooling and 
sharing mechanism to effectively distribute the tasks; (4) The possibility for units to be 
added to the pool or returned to national control at any moment; (5) the presence of 
a Functional Division. I have also shown that these characteristics make the model 
flexible enough to be replicated in other areas of the military domain. At the same 
time, the model tends to lose its advantages the further one moves away from logistics 
and the closer one comes to activities directly involving combat. The best possible 
candidates would be therefore areas such as sealift, training, or surveillance. 
Could a proliferation of these sectoral, bottom-up initiatives offer a true 
alternative to the top-down approach that has so far been followed for the CSDP? 
This would follow the argument made by Tomas Valasek with regard to ‘islands of 
cooperation’.187 Answering such a question goes, however, beyond the scope of this 
paper and would require further research. I have limited myself to showing that, at 
least within certain parameters, this kind of initiatives can and do provide a positive 
benefit by increasing the overall capacities of European countries. In a way, such an 
approach can trace its roots to the functionalist theories that have accompanied the 
European project since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951: start with a specific sector, and the spill-over effect will then gradually push the 
participants to also integrate in other areas. The debate on whether that is actually 
true or not has divided the academic community ever since.188 
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